

**By Pierre Oberling:**

## **NEGOTIATING FOR SURVIVAL**

### **Zeno's First Paradox on Motion**

When the Republic of Cyprus was created in 1960, it was as a fully independent, bi-communal state in which the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities had the status of co-founders and equal partners. The rights of both communities were safeguarded by a constitution that contained 199 articles and was a model of precision. A Treaty of Guarantee between the United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece assured the independence and territorial integrity of the new state. A Treaty of Alliance between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus provided for its security. Finally, the Republic of Cyprus was universally recognized and given a seat at the United Nations. The Turkish Cypriots, comprising one-fifth of the Cypriot population, felt safe and looked forward to many years of peace and prosperity. But the Greek Cypriots, under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios, who had become the first President of Cyprus, regarded independence as but a stepping-stone towards union with Greece (or *Enosis*), and openly sought the complete Melanization of the island. As Makarios put it: "Unless this small Turkish community forming a part of the Turkish race...is expelled, the duties of the heroes of EOKA can never be considered as terminated." EOKA was the Greek Cypriot guerrilla organization that had fought against British rule in order to achieve Enosis. It was now rearmed to bring about the destruction of the Cypriot Republic and the absorption of the island by Greece.

For the purposes of establishing the legal framework for Enosis and neutralizing all opposition to this scheme, Makarios first forced the resignation of the distinguished German jurist who was serving as president of his Supreme Constitutional Court. Then he implemented a plan-the so-called "Akritas Plan"-with the aim of cowing the Turkish Cypriots into submission. The Akritas Plan, which later was published by the Greek newspaper *Patris*, was signed by a person who identified himself only as "The Chief, Akritas," but was, in fact, none other than Makarios's minister of interior, Polykarpos Yorgadjis, the very man who at that time was responsible for maintaining internal peace in Cyprus.

According to this plan, the Turkish Cypriots would be presented with a series of proposed amendments to the constitution of 1960, which would deprive them of rights which were so fundamental that they were included in the unalterable "Basic Article" of the Constitution, such as that of having veto power over governmental decisions, of having their own municipalities, and of being judged by their own peers. Should Turkish Cypriots reject these amendments, the Greek Cypriots would "show their strength to the Turkish immediately and forcefully" with the result that the Turkish Cypriots would "probably be brought to their senses." Amendments were submitted to the Turkish Cypriot leadership on November 30, 1963. But even before the Turkish Cypriots had had time to complete their study of the project constitutional changes, EOKA and other paramilitary organizations were into action. Their acts of aggression, which began in late December, were of extreme brutality. Two of the first ones were the slaughter of 25 Turkish Cypriot patients at the Nicosia General Hospital on December 23, and the killings of 21 Turkish Cypriots (including a 10 year old girl) in the village of Ayios Vasilios and Skilloura on December 24.

At the same time, Makarios dismissed all the Turkish Cypriot civil servants, cabinet ministers, and members of the House of Representatives (the unicameral Cypriot parliament). He also discharged all the Turkish Cypriot diplomats at the United Nations and

in foreign capitals, making it difficult for the Turkish Cypriots to present their case to the world.

But the Turkish Cypriots refused to surrender. They armed themselves with knives, pitchforks, and hunting rifles, and, with these rudimentary weapons, defended themselves to the best of their ability. In February 1964, when the United States under secretary of state, George W. Ball, visited Cyprus, he was appalled by what he saw. He accused Archbishop Makarios of turning Cyprus into his “private abattoir” and concluded that the Greek Cypriots “just want to be left alone to kill Turkish Cypriots.” But the rest of the world was only too willing to believe Greek Cypriot propaganda to the effect that the turmoil in Cyprus was merely an outbreak of intercommunal strife, and the United Nations contented itself with sending a totally ineffective “peacekeeping” force (UNFICYP), which for the most part, limited its activities to observing the killing of the Turkish Cypriots.

Amazingly, Makarios, for all his fanaticism, was regarded by many Greek Cypriots as too moderate, and there were several powerful Greek Cypriot and Greek leaders who, living on the wilder shores of ethnic paranoia, advocated even more radical solutions than the Akritas Plan. For example, there was Nicos Sampson, a Greek Cypriot nationalist firebrand who, together with Dimitrios Ioannides, a Greek officer stationed in Cyprus, approached Makarios with a plan to slaughter the entire Turkish population (see Oriana Fallaci, *Interview with History*, Boston, 1976, p.318). Then there was George Grivas, the Greek general of Cypriot origin, who had been the organizer of EOKA and had transformed the campaign against the British colonial administration in the 1950s into an anti-Turkish Cypriot crusade.

In June 1964, Prime Minister George Papandreou of Greece, who later was to declare, “Cyprus must become the springboard for the dreams of Alexander the Great in the Orient, “offered Makarios a helping hand. Encouraged by the United Nations’ apathy regarding the Cyprus problem, he sent General Grivas to Cyprus to coordinate future military action against the Turkish Cypriots. Papandreou also instructed his minister of defense, Peter Garoufallias, to secretly send Greek troops to the island, and by the end of the summer no less than 20 000 Greek officers and men had beefed up Makarios’s forces. These troops became the backbone of the new “Cypriot” National Guard, which was set up by Makarios in direct violation of the constitution of 1960 and the Treaty of Alliance.

At this point, Turkey had every reason to intervene under the Treaty of Guarantee, for a coup was clearly in the making, the aim of which was to destroy the independence and territorial integrity of the Cypriot Republic. But the Turkish government was reluctant to jeopardize NATO solidarity. It was also loathe undertaking a military operation, which might have caused additional bloodshed, for Makarios, had warned that “should Turkey intervene to save Turkish Cypriots, it would find no Turkish Cypriot to save. “Therefore, it limited itself to sending vitally needed supplies to the various pockets of Turkish Cypriot resistance. However, in August 1964, Turkish warplanes strafed some of Grivas’s troops as these forces, with armoured cars, mortars and bazookas, were attacking the little seaport of Erenköy, which was one of the last remaining links between the Turkish Cypriots and the rest of the world.

This action, though modest in scale, finally convinced Makarios that further acts of violence would be counterproductive. As a result, his campaign of terror against the Turkish Cypriot community gradually subsided.

By the end of 1964, Makarios had achieved only his immediate goal—the destruction of the Republic of Cyprus. But it was Pyrrhic victory, for, even though he had established an all-Greek Cypriot government, he was no nearer to achieve Enosis. The Turkish Cypriot community had held firm, but it had been reduced to an extreme state of poverty and

wretchedness. The massacres of 1963 and 1964 had taken the lives of 364 Turkish Cypriots, and hundreds more were missing. Moreover 103 villages had been chased from their homes, becoming refugees in already overcrowded Turkish enclaves.

During the period following the massacres of 1963 and 1964, the Greek Cypriot leaders gradually dismantled every aspect of the Cypriot partnership state through a series of acts that were totally unconstitutional, and when Archbishop Makarios was questioned about the legality of these acts, he declared that “the Constitution of 1960 is dead and buried”. Meanwhile, on June 26, 1967, the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives (which consisted only of the Greek Cypriot members of the former House and continued to legislate illegally) passed the following resolution: “No matter what difficulties and hardships are encountered, the struggle being waged with the full support of the Hellenic world will not be terminated until the final goal (namely Enosis) is successfully attained. “Finally, the Greek Cypriots deprived the Turkish Cypriots, who had become stateless persons, of all government services (except for the insurance of exit visas to leave the country permanently). To make matters yet worse, fortifications and coils of barbed wire surrounded the congested Turkish Cypriot enclaves in an attempt to prevent the importation of all supplies except those needed for barest survival.

With these actions, the Makarios regime lost all claim to legitimacy. By then Makarios and his Greek allies had also broken the Zurich-London Accords (which had led to the creation of the Republic of Cyprus), the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance. Yet not a single state withdrew its recognition of the Makarios “government,” and his rogue state was allowed to remain a member in good standing of the United Nations. Thus Makarios had been able to perpetuate the fiction that his “government” represented all Cypriots, regardless of their ethnic origin, and also he was encouraged to continue his oppression of the Turkish Cypriot community.

In 1967, General Grivas, who had returned to Cyprus after a period of self-imposed exile in Greece, and had assumed the title of commander in chief of all Greek and Greek Cypriot forces on the island, launched a new wave of attacks on Turkish Cypriots villages. On November 14 and 15 alone, more than 30 Turkish Cypriots were killed, including the three sons of an elderly couple and an 80 – year- old man who was burned alive by being wrapped in a gasoline-soaked blanket and set on fire. But again, the world was willing to believe what the Greek Cypriot leaders told everyone, namely that these were minor intercommunal disturbances instigated by Turkish Cypriot agitators. Once more, UNFICYP (the United Nations peacekeeping force) failed to save any Turkish Cypriot lives, and it was only Turkey’s threats of intervention that finally put end to the slaughter of defenseless villagers.

In November 1967, an agreement was worked out between Greece and Turkey that provided for the withdrawal from Cyprus within 45 days of all Greek troops in excess of those permitted by the Treaty of Alliance; the dissolution of the illegal National Guard; and compensation by the Greek Cypriot government to the victims of Grivas’s savagery. However, predictably enough, Makarios never bothered to comply with this agreement, and his illegal forces continued to intimidate and harass the Turkish Cypriot population.

In late 1973, Dimitrios Ioannides, by then a general, seized power in Greece. Needing an immediate triumph to compensate for the Greek junta’s declining popularity, he decided to overthrow the government of Makarios, which had repeatedly failed to bring the long-suffering Turkish Cypriot community to its knees, and bring about instant Enosis. In July 1974, additional Greek troops were smuggled into Cyprus, where they joined the Greek-officered National Guard and a new paramilitary organization called EOKA-B.

The resulting coup forced Makarios to flee and established a new pro-Enosis government under Ioannides's friend, Nicos Sampson, who in 1969 had been elected to the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives with the slogan, "Death to the Turks."

Sampson at once embarked upon a massacre of Makarios's followers. More than a thousand of Greek Cypriots were killed in less than a week. Because of Sampson's long history of violence against the Turkish Cypriot community, the Turkish Cypriot leaders, as well as the government of Turkey, looked with dismay upon his rise to power. Rauf Denktaş, the head of Turkish Cypriot community, aptly pointed out that Sampson was "as unacceptable as Adolf Hitler would be as president of Israel". It is at this point that the Turkish intervention took place. As the former British Prime Minister, Sir Douglas Home commented: "**Turkey has been provoked beyond endurance.**" In any case, the Turkish intervention was perfectly legal, according to the Treaty of Guaranty, which Makarios himself had signed.

Its legality has even been acknowledged by the Standing Committee of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in a resolution dated July 29, 1974, and by the Athens Court of Appeals in a decision dated March 21, 1979. In 1975, Sampson admitted that he was just about to proclaim Enosis when Turkish intervention occurred, (*Cyprus Mail*, July 17, 1975) wrote "**When Turkish troops landed in Northern Cyprus, the National Guard and Eoka-B, in a frenzy of frustration and rage, slaughtered hundreds of Turkish Cypriot townspeople and villagers**". But the Turks, displaying exemplary restraint, occupied only a small strip of territory between the port of Kyrenia and the inland capital Nicosia. They hoped that this limited operation would trigger changes that would lead to the establishment of a new partnership state in Cyprus.

The Turkish intervention caused the immediate downfall of the Sampson regime in Cyprus. It even led to the resignation of the much-hated Greek junta and the establishment of democracy in Greece. Moreover, at a conference in Geneva hastily summoned by the British Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, and attended by representatives from both Greece and Turkey, the new Greek regime was persuaded to sign an agreement (on July 30, 1974) to the effect that all armed forces, including irregular forces, were to deist from all offensive or hostile activities; that all Greek and Greek Cypriot were to withdraw at once from Turkish Cypriot enclaves they had occupied; and that all military personnel and civilians detained as a result of the recent hostilities were to be exchanged or released.

This seemed like a promising beginning in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem. But a second conference convened by the British foreign secretary later that summer attended not only by representatives from Greece and Turkey, but also by representatives from the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, negotiations quickly reached a stalemate-perhaps because more substantial issue were being debated, such as the formation of a new Cypriot government. As an impartial observer was to write: "The uncompromising spirit of Makarios weighed heavily over the Greek Cypriot delegation.... There was little awareness of Turkey's determination and the unfortunate overconfidence that somehow, unbelievably, the status quo could be restored."

At the same time, Turkish hopes that the fall of Sampson would bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities against the Turkish Cypriot community were dashed as the National Guard and EOKA-B refused to release hundreds of Turkish Cypriots hostages held by them in Limassol, Larnaca and Paphos, and as armed Greek Cypriots continued to occupy Turkish Cypriot enclaves in defiance of the agreement of July 30.

Accordingly, in mid-August 1974, the Turks resumed their advances, this time for the purpose of securing for the Turkish Cypriots a safe, Turkish-protected home in Northern Cyprus. But, before this could be accomplished, the National Guard and EOKA-B once more

vented their rage against the Turkish Cypriot enclaves to reign of terror of unsurpassed ferocity. The worst massacres took place in the villages of Aloa, Maratha and Sandallaries, where most of the inhabitants were shot and then hastily covered with dirt with a bulldozer that dismembered the corpses as it buried them.

On August 19, a Greek Cypriot mob, angry because the United States refused to use its troops to stem the Turkish advance, also stormed the United States Embassy in Nicosia. In the ensuing fusillade, the American ambassador, Rodger Paul Davies, and his Maronite Greek secretary were killed.

The new Turkish military operation and the Greek Cypriot massacres of the Turkish Cypriot villagers precipitated a major population shift on the island, as large numbers of the Turkish Cypriots from the south started moving north and large number of Greek Cypriots from the north started moving south.

During the years that followed the Sampson *Putsch* and the Turkish intervention, Makarios, who had unconstitutionally (even according his illegally amended constitution) reassumed his position as “president” of the Greek Cypriot government, became increasingly, and unexpectedly, accommodating. Although he continued to insist that his signature would “never be put under an agreement that will give a stone to the Turks,” he nevertheless allowed his government to participate in a series of United Nations-sponsored intercommunal talks at which both sides were represented by an “interlocutor.” At the third round of these talks, which ended on August 2, 1975, an agreement was reached on a population exchange between Northern Cyprus and Southern Cyprus, paving the way for a bizonal solution to the Cyprus problem.

By early 1977, Makarios had mellowed to such an extent that he even accepted an invitation from Rauf Denktaş for the two leaders to convene at some neutral location. As a result, two summit meetings took place at the United Nations’ headquarters in Nicosia—the first on January 27 and the second one February 12. Rather unexpectedly, the two leaders had a meeting of minds, and their final communiqué called for the creation of an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal federal republic, with the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities each administering a separate territory. Thus, Makarios formally endorsed the principle of bi-zonality.

To the Turkish Cypriots, this was a development of paramount importance. Ever since the consolidation of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves into one ethnically homogenous,

Turkish-protected zone in Northern Cyprus in 1974 and 1975, the Turkish Cypriots had, for the first time in many years, felt safe; they were determined never again to expose themselves to the tyranny of a Greek Cypriot administration. By officially recognizing, for the first time, that the demographic changes that had occurred were irreversible, Makarios had made it possible for negotiations to proceed on a realistic basis.

In March 1977, Makarios further astonished the world by telling a Danish correspondent: “I regret many things and most of all Enosis on my part”. This was a highly promising statement. But, unfortunately, on August 3, 1977, Makarios died suddenly of a heart attack, and with him went whatever hopes there may have been for a solution to the Cyprus problem.

## **CYPRUS AFTER MAKARIOS' DEATH ON AUGUST 3, 1977.**

### **Spyros Kyprianou Era.**

His long time associate, Spyros Kyprianou, who, at the time of the Archbishop's death, was speaker of the Greek Cypriot House of representatives, succeeded Makarios. He at once affirmed that he would "faithfully follow the policies of our great leader and president in all fields. "Then, at a meeting with a president Denktas at the United Nations headquarters in Nicosia in May 1979, he signed an agreement that stated unequivocally that the intercommunal talks would be resumed on the basis of the guidelines set by the Makarios-Denktaş talks of January and February 1977, pledged both sides to "abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks," and stressed that special importance would be given to "initial practical measures by both sides to promote good will, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions".

But the New Greek Cypriot head of state was, at bottom, a relentless hardliner. He regarded the period of Greek Cypriots hegemony in Cyprus between December 1963 and July 1974 as a kind of golden age, and he often referred to it as the "happiest of times". His main goal was to force the Turkish Cypriots to become once more second-class citizens (or, more precisely, non-citizens) in a Greek Cypriot-dominated state. The Turkish Cypriots, he believed, were merely a rebellious minority. To negotiate with their leaders would be to dignify them with the status of an equal. Therefore, Kyprianou showed no interest in future face-to-face meetings with his Turkish Cypriot counterpart.

Although the intercommunal talks were, for a while, allowed to continue, they gradually floundered on the bedrock of Greek Cypriot intransigence. In an about-turn, Kyprianou argued, against all evidence to the contrary, that the principle of bizonality had never been endorsed by the Makarios-Denktaş talks of 1977. He also began to insist that no headway in the negotiations was possible unless the Turkish Cypriots accepted what he called the "three freedoms," namely freedom of movement throughout the island, freedom of settlement anywhere on the island, and freedom of owning property in any part of the island.

But the Turkish Cypriots remembered only too vividly that, during Kyprianou's "happiest of times" they were denied all three freedoms.

As it became increasingly clear that President Kyprianou could not compel the Turkish Cypriots to give up their hard-won autonomy by means of negotiation, he attempted to achieve the same goal by means of imposing an economic embargo upon the Turkish Cypriot zone and of practicing what he termed “aggressive diplomacy”, which consisted of urging other governments to refrain from establishing any economic links with the Turkish Cypriots and to put pressure on Turkey to withdraw its troops from Northern Cyprus.

The main purpose of the embargo was to strangle the Turkish Cypriot economy. It was a blatant violation of the Kyprianou-Denktaş agreement of May 1979. It also reinforced the conviction of many Turkish Cypriots that they needed all the land at their disposal to grow food on, and made them less disposed in the future to trade territory for a settlement. Finally, it made it necessary for the Turkish Cypriots to import Turkish farmers and farm labourers to increase agricultural production.

President Kyprianou’s unwillingness to bargain in good faith with the Turkish Cypriots alienated even some of his closest collaborators. As early as July 1978, his own interlocutor at the intercommunal talks, Tassos Papadopoulos, expressed his disappointment, publicly castigating him for his intransigence. In September 1983, Kyprianou’s own foreign minister, Nikes Rolandis, irked by Kyprianou’s suspension of the peace talks since April of that year, resigned. A few days later, he went so far as to accuse the Greek Cypriot president of being the “enemy of Cyprus”.

By November 1983, a solution to the Cyprus problem seemed more remote than ever, and the Turkish Cypriot leaders had come to believe that only a series of summit meetings between Presidents Kyprianou and Denktaş could re-establish a meaningful dialogue between the two communities. Yet Kyprianou was still adamantly opposed to the resumption of this type of meeting, arguing that it would be tantamount to recognizing the Turkish Cypriot head of state as an equal. The Turkish Cypriots then concluded that only by means of a declaration of independence on their part could Kyprianou be brought back to conference table. If Kyprianou was unwilling to negotiate with a person of inferior status, the Turkish Cypriots reasoned, the problem could be solved quite simply by raising the status of Denktaş to that of president of an independent state. In any case, by forming their own official government, the Turkish Cypriots were merely recognizing a *fate accompli*. As early as the 1960s, when the Greek Cypriots had made the Turkish Cypriots stateless, they had had no choice but to set up an administration of their own to provide basic, life sustaining services to their own community. As the years passed, and isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community continued, this administration had become gradually more complex and sophisticated.

Therefore, when the Turkish Cypriots declared their independence, on November 15, 1983, they already had a fully functioning, popularly elected government.

The Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence was condemned in much of the world. This was unfair, for, by forming their own official, mono-communal state, the Turkish Cypriots were exercising the same right as had the Greek Cypriots in forming theirs in 1964-except that the Turkish Cypriot did not have the effrontery to claim that their government was the government of Cyprus.

Although profoundly shocked, President Kyprianou was convinced that world pressure would soon force the Turkish Cypriots to rescind their declaration, and it became part of his “aggressively diplomacy” to attend as many international meetings as possible and urge the delegates at these conferences to pass resolutions condemning the Turkish Cypriots’ action. But this campaign yielded no concrete results. In September 1984, Kyprianou finally agreed to resume negotiations and participate in a series of so-called proximity talks in New York.

Thus, after years of claiming that he would never again meet Denktaş, for fear of giving the impression that he was recognizing the existence of a separate Turkish Cypriot state, Kybriamou did just that even if the two leaders negotiated from adjoining rooms at the United Nations headquarters. As the Washington Post observed, it was the diplomatic consensus in New York that “what made the progress possible was the unilateral declaration of independence by Denktaş.

As the proximity talks proceeded, all parties reported steady progress. The initial draft agreement submitted by United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar was modified several times to please Kyprianou. “During the final round of negotiations, “Perez de Cuellar later wrote:

***Major political decisions were taken, and I have to report that Turkish Cypriot side conveyed to me a position which was, both with regard to constitutional as well as the territorial aspects, substantially improved from the one which it had maintained in previous years”.***

According the final version of the draft agreement, the new Cypriot state was to be bi-communal as regard the federal constitutional aspect and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspect. “The Turkish Cypriots were to retain 29 plus percent of the land. The president was to be a Greek Cypriot, the vice president a Turkish Cypriot. There was to be a cabinet consisting of 10 ministers, three of whom (including the foreign minister) were to be Turkish Cypriot. A House of Representatives with a 70 percent Greek Cypriot and a 30 percent Turkish Cypriot membership, a Senate with membership equally divided between the two communities were to be established.

The Turkish Cypriots were to have veto power over all decisions of the federal government. Each of the two communities was to have its own police force. Finally, it was stipulated that a “time table for the withdrawal of non-Cypriot military troops and elements, as well as adequate guarantees”, were to be agreed upon” prior to the establishment of the transitional federal government.

The draft agreement seemed to please the both sides. In December 1984, President Denktaş announced that he accepted unconditionally every article in the agreement. President Kyprianou also expressed satisfaction.

***Every thing is fine, he declared. Our side has obtained the best possible conditions. All that remained was the signing of the draft agreement at a meeting to be held in New York on January17, 1985.***

But when this meeting took place, President Kyprianou astonished everyone by raising fundamental objections to every article in the draft agreement.



What caused Kyprianou to change his mind and reject the draft agreement, of which he was the co-author, remains unclear. Premier Andreas Papandreou of Greece, whom he visited before returning to New York, undoubtedly influenced him. Papandreou has always been a vocal critic of the Turks, and his rise to power following the October 1981 general elections triggered an immediate deterioration in Greco-Turks relations. During his political career, he has made many controversial statements, especially about Cyprus, which are uncomfortably reminiscent of those of the proponents of Enosis at any cost, such as Yorgadjis and Grivas, and he once referred to Cyprus as *part of our national soil*.

Another reason for Kyprianou's rejection of the draft agreement probably was his fear of alienating one of his most important constituencies- the Greek Cypriot refugees from the North. All of these refugees had by then been relocated and were fully employed in Southern Cyprus's booming economy. However, they still had a sentimental attachment to their former homes in the North, and because Kyprianou had acquired the reputation of being the most intransigent leader in the South, they strongly backed him. He, on the other hand, encouraged them to believe that they would "never sell them down the river". Thus, Kyprianou had painted himself into a corner: After having created the myth of return among the Greek Cypriots from the North he could not make any concessions concerning his "*three freedoms*" principle without incurring the wrath and enmity of this large and vocal part of the electorate. Kyprianou's about-face greatly undermined his credibility as a statement both at home and abroad, with result that in the next presidential election, which was held in February 1988, George Vasiliou, a self-made millionaire and political novice, easily defeated him.

*According to the first of Zeno's paradoxes on motion, a moving object cannot cover any given distance because it must first travel half that distance, then half of the remainder, and so on ad infinitum. By 1988, Turkish Cypriots efforts to solve the Cyprus problem were certainly reminiscent of that riddle. But with the rise to power in the Greek Cypriot community of a new leader who seemed to be more pragmatic than his predecessors, there was renewed optimism in the Turkish Cypriot community that moving object of Zeno's paradox would reach its destination.*

George Vasiliou Era

### **False Hopes:**

When he ran for president of the Greek Cypriot state, **George Vasiliou** promised that his first order of business, should he be elected, would be to launch a "peace offensive" and resume the inter-communal negotiations. He also promised to build bridges of trust with the Turkish Cypriots.

Accordingly, as soon as he heard that Vasiliou had won the second (and final) round of the election, Rauf Denktaş warmly congratulated him and offered to meet with

him in a neutral location astride the “Green Line”, which separates the Greek Cypriot quarter of Nicosia from the Turkish Cypriot quarter. However, to Denktaş’s profound disappointment, Vasiliou rejected the invitation, arguing “it would be absurd to renounce the very existence of the republic of Cyprus in order to have a cup of coffee with Mr. Denktaş”. Vasiliou then compounded the insult by suggesting that if Denktaş wanted to see him, all he had to do was make an appointment with his secretary like any Cypriot citizen.

Since that time, the new Greek Cypriot president has continued to disappoint those who saw him in his rise to power the dawn of a new era of mutual understanding between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. Shortly after the election he had written a letter to Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, the head of the Socialist Party and noted hardliner, reassuring him that Vasiliou presidency would give him no cause for complaint.

“The Cyprus problem”, Vassiliou asserted in this letter, “is a problem of invasion and occupation which resulted from foreign intervention a *coup d’etat*”. He indicated that his basic conditions for a solution of the Cyprus problem would be “the withdrawal of the Turkish military occupation forces and military materials and of the Turkish settlers without any exception before the establishment of a transitional government”; the safeguarding of “basic liberties, such as freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property, and especially the complete return of refugees to their homes”, and “international guarantees which will exclude foreign intervention”. He then added:

***In all our diplomatic and informational activities, priority will be given to these subjects. On these basic problems foreign governments and various factors which from the international media will be enlightened, and pressure on Turkey will be requested in order to increase the cost of Turkey’s presence here.***

Finally, Vassiliou maintained that “strengthening our defenses is an act of necessity to deter Turkey from any possible attack and bolster our bargaining position at the negotiating table”.

Like the vast majority of his fellow-Greek Cypriots, President Vassiliou seems to think that the Cyprus problem started with the Turkish “invasion” of 1974, he has conveniently forgotten the savage and unprovoked attacks against the Turkish Cypriot people that were carried out in 1963, 1964, and 1974, as well as the massacres that the Sampson *Putsh* unleashed.

He also seems untroubled by the fact that thus far not a single Greek Cypriot, and that even the monstrous Nicos Sampson ( who once boasted that he killed one person for every of every year of his life) walks free.

He refuses to acknowledge that the Greek Cypriot governments have habitually broken treaties and international agreements providing for safety and welfare of the Turkish Cypriots people, including the Zurich-London Accords, the Constitution of 1960, the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, the Agreement of November 1967, and the Agreement of July 1974, and that, therefore, the Turkish Cypriots have legitimate excuse for caution, in dealing with the Greek Cypriot government. He has

made no effort to repeal any of the unconstitutional legislation of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives. He has not even repudiated its Enosis proclamation of June 26, 1967. In fact he has made things worse yet by declaring to Greek journalist on January 26, 1989 that Cyprus is a Greek island and a *bastion of Greece*.

In almost every respect, Vassiliou's presidency has been a repetition of Kyprianou's. He has even retained the economic embargo on the Turkish Cypriot state and continued to encourage the Greek Cypriot refugees in the South to believe that they will be some day be able to return to their former homes in the North. Moreover, he has practiced his own form of *aggressive diplomacy*.

Just as Kyprianou for several years deluded himself into believing that world pressure would force the Turkish Cypriot government to rescind its Declaration of Independence, Vassiliou seems to think that Turkey, because its eagerness to be accepted as a member of the Eurpian Community (EC), can be pressured into pulling its troops out of Northern Cyprus and into compelling the Turkish Cypriot government to agree to Greek Cypriot terms for a solution to the Cyprus problem. Like his predecessor, he prefers internationalization of the problem to direct talks, and he tries to sell his point of view at numerous international conferences. At these gatherings, he contends that conditions were normal in Cyprus and that relations between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots were, on the whole, harmonious until the Turkish army invaded the island and divided it by force of arms. Therefore, the Cyprus problem is not an intercommunal one, and the obvious solution is for the Turks to withdraw their occupation force, which make it impossible for the legitimate government of Cyprus to exercise its rightful functions in the North., which prevent the Greek Cypriot refugees from the North and the Turkish Cypriot refugees from the South from returning to their homes, and which have created an artificial boundary (which he likes to compare to the Berlin Wall) all across the island.

In order to call attention to the issue of the border, Vassiliou and his government have been organizing *spontaneous demonstrations* along its entire length. For example, on October 16, 1988, some 300 Greek Cypriot men, women and children carrying Greek flags started marching towards the village of Bostanci in Turkish Cypriot territory. But they were stopped by United Nations troops while crossing the U.N. buffer zone.

On November 15, 1988, a large number of Greek Cypriot students, who had been granted a leave of absence from their schools, violated the U.N. buffer zone and penetrated into Turkish Cypriot territory at the Ledra Palace checkpoint in Nicosia. They were carrying Greek flags and chanting anti-Turkish slogans, and, as they emerged into the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Nicosia, they attacked Turkish Cypriot border guards and pelted both civilians and journalists with stones.

On March 19, 1989, several thousand of Greek Cypriot women carrying Greek flags massed around villages of Akhna and Lymbia, crossed the U.N. buffer zone, and then pushed their way into Turkish Cypriot territory, where they were met and repulsed by Turkish women. On March 29, 1989, another violent demonstration by Greek Cypriot students with leaves of absence took place at the Ledra Palace checkpoint. Later, the Greek Cypriot administration expressed its *appreciation* and

*pride* claiming that the Greek Cypriot students who had participated in the demonstration had defended the *honor of Hellenism*. On July 19, 1989, a group of about 1,000 Greek Cypriots forced its way into the U.N. buffer zone, and some 100 of the demonstrators then penetrated into Turkish Cypriot territory near the Famagusta gate in Nicosia, where they were arrested and briefly detained by the Turkish Cypriot police. The organizers of this demonstration had openly announced their intention to hoist the Greek flag on the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The demonstrators, who were encouraged by the Greek Cypriot minister of defense and other officials, included Greek Orthodox priest, Greek Cypriot policemen, and National Guard soldiers in civilian clothes. On October 15, 1989, yet another group of demonstrators, which included political and religious leaders, tried (but unsuccessfully) to cross the U.N. buffer zone near the village of Astromeritis.

At the same time, president Vassiliou has tried to intimidate the Turkish government into withdrawing its support for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus by threatening to do his utmost to prevent Turkey from being admitted as a member of the European Communities. But all that Vassiliou's own brand of *aggressive diplomacy* has accomplished is to increase intercommunal tensions. Both the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish governments have stood firm for what they believe is a just cause—namely the right of the Turkish Cypriot people to live free from fear. As regards the question EC membership, the statements of Turkish officials have all been unequivocal. For example in a speech delivered in Munich, West Germany, in September 1989, Mesut Yilmaz, the then Turkish foreign minister, said:

*To try to establish a link between Turkey's full membership in EC and the Cyprus dispute (which can only be settled by two sides on the island) is not only an approach that we cannot accept, but one that will not contribute to Greko-Turkish relations or to the settlement of the Cyprus question.*

Although he seemed at first disinclined to engage President Denktaş in face-to-face negotiations, President Vassiliou finally decided (after considerable prodding by Secretary General Perez de Cuellar) to honor his pre-electoral pledge to do so. The two leaders had their first meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, on August 24, 1988.

At this brief, get-acquainted conference under the auspices of Perez de Cuellar, the two heads of state agreed to work together in the hope of resolving all their major differences by June 1, 1989. They proclaimed that they had *created a new opportunity for finding a just and lasting peace*. But they also admitted that this goal could only be achieved by means of *a determined and sustained effort by both sides, as well as the creation of an atmosphere of mutual confidence*.

## FIRST ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH VASSILLIOU

On 15 September 1988, a first round of negotiations (cautiously referred to as a *sounding phase*) was launched in Nicosia. At these U.N. Sponsored talks, which were held in the presence of Oscar Chameleon (Perez de Cuellar's special

representative in Cyprus), the two leaders met for a total 40 hours, during which they explored a wide range of options for a solution to the Cyprus problem.

In these talks, president Denktaş explained in great detail his government's views on the formation of a future Cypriot state. These were then incorporated into series of proposals, which were submitted to President Vassiliou on November 1, 1990. President Denktaş pointed out that as early as 1963 the partnership state called the "Cyprus Republic" had been split up by the Greek Cypriots themselves into two separate administrative entities-one that was composed of a group of Turkish Cypriot enclaves and that was administered by the Turkish Cypriot partner, and one that consist of the Greeks Cypriot-inhabited territories surrounding these enclaves and that was administered by the Greek Cypriot partner. Accordingly, when President Denktaş and Makarios met in early 1977, they concluded that any future Cypriot state would have to be bi-zonal, bi-communal federal republic (Agreement of February 12, 1977). These guidelines were even endorsed by the intransigent Kyprianou on May 19, 1979 and were reflected by a statement of Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar on August 9, 1980, which stated:

***Both parties have reaffirmed their support for a federal solution of the constitutional aspect of the Cyprus problem.*** Denktaş reassured Vassiliou that the Turkish Cypriot position was fully in line with the Makarios-Denktaş guidelines, and he stressed that *it is necessary that both sides should adhere to the principles and concepts agreed to during the negotiating process.*

President Denktaş then underlined, as he had done in the past, that ***all aspects of the Cyprus question are closely interlinked and must, therefore, be taken up as an integrated whole.***

As regards the ***three freedoms*** (freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, and the right of property), Denktaş reminded Vassiliou that the population exchange, which had taken place following the Sampson Putsch, had been fully endorsed by the Greek Cypriots in the formal agreement of August 2, 1975. He also indicated that, accord in to a number of international conventions; the right to live and the right to enjoy peace and security take precedence over the type of freedoms, which the Greek Cypriots keep mentioning. Then he added:

***It is clear that the protection of the rights and freedoms of the Turkish Cypriot people, victims of an eleven- year-long campaign of harassment, oppression and discrimination at the hands of the Greek Cypriots, makes it imperative that the control and regulation of the three freedoms in the North be solely within the authority and jurisdiction of the future Turkish Cypriot federated state, so as to insure that the basic rights and freedoms of the Turkish Cypriots are not again jeopardized. Similarly, the control and regulation of the three freedoms in the South will be within the authority and jurisdiction of the future Greek Cypriot federated state.***

Denktaş suggested that the questions of settlement and the ownership of property be solved first, even before the establishment of the proposed federation, through compensation or exchange of property. This would make it easier to solve the freedom of movement issue in the course of later negotiations.

Denktaş then took up the question of equality between the two federated states in the projected federation. *In view of the fact the proposed federal republic, will be composed of two equal units.* He maintained, *it is essential that each member state of the federation, irrespective of the size of its geographical area and irrespective of the size of its population, should be in all respects be an equal member of the federation.*

As to the powers of the future Cypriot government, Denktaş emphasized that it was his government's view that they should be limited, *so as to minimize possible areas of friction*, and that residual powers should remain with the federal states. Moreover, there should be *constitutional safeguards*, such as separate majorities in voting and vote rights, to ensure, *the political equality and the effective participation of the two components of the future federation in the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the federal state and all other organs of the federal estate.*

Finally, he stated his government would insist that the 1960 treaty of Guarantee and treaty of Alliance be maintained, and that *the total or partial union of Cyprus with any other country should be outlawed and any overt act or propaganda for its realization must be a punishable offence.*

Meanwhile, President Vassiliou proposed that the Turkish Cypriots be allowed to administer an area, or province, in the Northern Cyprus. But the *three freedoms* would have to be fully implemented. A joint central government would be set up. But neither community would have the power to veto its decisions. The island would be completely demilitarised. In fact, both the Turkish troops and the Turkish immigrants would have to depart before the establishment of the projected government. The independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus would be protected by a group of guarantors. But these would consist of the members of the U.N. Security Council, and no member would have the power to intervene unilaterally. U.N. forces could cope with any civil disturbances that might arise on the island. Finally Vassiliou insisted that all decisions made by Denktaş and him regarding constitutional matters be incorporated into Constitution of 1960 by means of a series of amendments.

## ANALYSIS

Inasmuch as this has been Vassiliou's standard set of proposals, which he has been promoting all over the world, it is well worth analyzing. In the Akritas Plan, which led to the destruction of the Republic of Cyprus as a bi-communal partnership state, and which provided a blueprint for the massacres of 1963 and 1964, it was stipulated that series of amendments to the constitution of 1960 should at first be proposed. These amendments would seem *reasonable and just* to the world at large, but they would actually deprive the Turkish Cypriots of their status of political equality.

Then; *Once this is achieved, the Treaty of Guarantee ( the right of intervention) will become legally and substantially inapplicable.* Finally, *when the Treaty of Guarantee is removed no legal or moral force will remain to obstruct us in determining our future (the proclamation of Enosis) through the plebiscite.*

Vassiliou's proposals would do away with all of these annoying preliminaries and inevitably bring about instant Enosis. It is no accident that it is the Greek flag, and

not the flag of Cyprus, which Greek Cypriot demonstrators have been carrying with them on their provocative border crossings, and which they tried to hoist on the Turkish Cypriot territory on July, 1989.

In any case, the very thought of resuscitating the Constitution of 1960 is absurd, for even Makarios, as we have seen, declared it to be *dead and buried*. As Denktaş told Vassiliou, when the Greek Cypriot president suggested amending the Constitution of 1960, *There is no longer any constitution to amend*.

Equally unrealistic is the demand that the Turkish immigrants in Cyprus be expelled from their homes and sent back to Turkey—especially those who have acquired Turkish Cypriot citizenship or have intermarried with Turkish Cypriots. When considering this question, it should be kept in mind that the newcomers are necessary for the economic well-being of the Turkish Cypriot community, and that they are merely replacing the thousands of impoverished Turkish Cypriot farmers who, during what Kyprianou had described as the *happiest of times*, had been deprived of their lands and forced to flee to Turkey, Great Britain and other countries to make a living.

The first round of the intercommunal talks in Nicosia ended on November 7, 1988. The two leaders had met as many as twenty two times. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar noted that it was the first time in a quarter century that the leaders of the two communities had made *such a sustained effort to work toward a solution*. But all that had been accomplished was that Denktaş and Vassiliou had become better acquainted with each other's points of view concerning the Cyprus problem.

## FURTHER TALKS

**The Secretary-General next invited the two leaders to New York to review the first round of talks and to agree on the procedure and programmed for what is to follow. The meeting took place on November 22 and 23, 1988. President Denktaş came equipped with a new set of proposals, which, he said, were flexible on issues, which the Greek Cypriot side complains most about. In return, he added, he expected the Greek Cypriots to show how flexible they can be on the constitutional aspects and how willing they are to respect the political equality of the Turkish Cypriots.**

## TURKISH PROPOSALS IN NEW YORK CITY MEETING

Concerning the *three freedoms* Denktaş made the following recommendations:

### 1. Freedom of Movement:

- a. It will be implemented upon the coming into operation of the federal constitutional system.

- b. The police of both federal republics will carry out the necessary controls, which fall within their respective spheres of authority, and undesirable persons may be excluded or expelled from the territory of each federated republic.

## **2. Freedom of Settlement:**

- a. Moratorium for a period of 18 years will be applied on the implementation of this freedom. Provision will be made for the review of this period at the end of ninth year after the commencement of the moratorium.
- b. After the end of the moratorium, each federated republic will determine a ceiling on the number of the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, respectively, which such federated republic will be able to accept for the purpose of settlement. Such ceiling may either be in respect of the federal republic concerned as a whole and/or on the basis of specific inhabited areas.
- c. Each federated republic within the specified ceiling will regulate matters relating to settlement.

## **3. Freedom of Ownership of Property:**

- a. Claims by Turkish Cypriots and by Greek Cypriots in respect of property in Northern Cyprus and Southern Cyprus, respectively, arising from the pre-1974 period, will have been settled, by way of exchange and/or compensation, by a mixed commission before the establishment of the federation.
- b. After a settlement of all property claims relating to the period before the establishment of the federation, there will be a moratorium of 18 years on the matter of persons belonging to one federated republic.
- c. The exercise of the "right to property" , will be regulated by the respective federated republic, with the object of pre-serving the fundamental characteristics of the federation.

## **Concerning the question of Cypriots and non-Cypriots forces in Cyprus, Denktaş made the following recommendations:**

1. A balance will be established between non-Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot forces in Northern Cyprus, on the one hand, and non-Cypriot and Greek Cypriot forces in the Southern Cyprus, on the other, on the date on which transitional Federal Government is formed.
2. After the establishment of the Transitional Government;
3. Non-Cypriot forces, in accordance with a previously agreed timetable, will be brought to the level necessary for ensuring adequate and effective guarantees.
4. The strength of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot forces will be regulated by the respective federated republic in accordance with previously agreed principles and parallel to the above.
5. The concept of balance referred to above is intended in the sense of a general equilibrium (details of which may be agreed on between the two sides) based on the strength and capabilities of the forces involved.



Concerning adequate and effective guarantees, Denktaş made the following Recommendation:

*It is the view of the Turkish Cypriot side that after the federal structure has taken shape and arrangements have been made on the details of such structure, the three Guarantor powers, after obtaining the views of the two sides, will engage in consultations among themselves with a view to reaching agreement on this matter as part of an integrated whole.*

Denktaş also recommended that the question of the federal structure of the projected state should be taken up at the next stage of the talks, and warned that no progress could be expected in future talks until agreement is reached on questions *which are essential elements of the constitutional aspect, namely:*

- 1. Political equality of the partnership and peoples;*
- 2. Effective participation in the federal organs and in the decision-making process.*
- 3. Constitutional safeguards.*

**Denktaş then concluded by once more stressing that naturally, our aim is a bi-communal, bi-zonal federal republic built on the equality of the two peoples.**

President Denktaş's proposals included significant concessions to the Greek Cypriots, especially in that he tried to integrate the *three freedoms* principle within the framework of a bi-zonal state. But Vassiliou declared that, inasmuch as Denktaş's proposals had come complete surprise to him, he was not prepared to discuss them. As a result, no negotiations took place in that meeting. According to a spokesman for the Secretary-General, the two leaders, as they parted company, merely *reaffirmed their commitment to what they had agreed to in Geneva and to pursue this effort with goodwill and determination* in a new round of intercommunal talks to be held in Nicosia.

The second round of intercommunal talks comprised twenty-six meetings and lasted from December 19, 1988 to March 28, 1989. At the meeting of January 9, 1989, Denktaş offered an expanded version of his proposals of November 22, 1988, containing, among the other items, guidelines for deconfrontation measures in Nicosia area, and at the meeting of January 30, 1989, he submitted a series of proposals entitled "**The Turkish Cypriot Approach to the Federal Legislature as part of an Integrated Whole.**"

## **GREEK PROPOSALS**

At the meeting of January 30, 1989, President Vassiliou also finally presented his government's own set of proposals entitled, **Outline Proposals for the Establishment of a Federal Republic and for the Solution of the Cyprus Problem.** It was essentially a reiteration of the Greek Cypriot stand on all major issues in the Cyprus conflict. For example, under the headings of **Demilitarization and Security** one find the following clause.

1. The Greek Cypriot side believes that the way to remove both external and internal threats is the complete demilitarization of the Republic. This involves;
2. Withdrawal from the territory of the Republic of all non-Cypriot military forces and elements, including settlers, and;
3. The complete disbanding of all Cypriot military forces.
4. A timetable for the demilitarization of the Republic and the withdrawal of the settlers must be drawn up and implemented before the establishment of the federal government or any transitional arrangement. To enhance the feeling of security of both communities, international supervision of demilitarization should be provided for.
5. Provision should be made for a U.N. controlled international force to assist in the maintenance of internal security on the federal and on the provincial level for as long as necessary.
6. The Greek Cypriot side is particularly concerned about the withdrawal of Turkish settlers, whose presence is altering the demographic structure of the country, and who present a security risk for the whole island

Under the heading of “**The Protection of Human Rights,**” Vassiliou’s proposals underlined the importance to the Greek Cypriot government of the **three freedoms** and concluded with the following clause **The Greek Cypriot side is ready to discuss various options concerning the political difficulties, but whatever the arrangements made they must be such as not to frustrate or negate the principles involved, either overtly, indirectly or in spirit.**

**Under the heading of Guarantees, one finds following clauses:**

- The Federal Republic of Cyprus, as a sovereign, independent state and member of the United Nations Organization, can only have guarantees, which will be in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
- Any guarantees given should be multilateral. In the view of the Greek Cypriot side, the best guarantee would be one by the Security Council.
- No guarantor should have unilateral rights of intervention.
- The scope of any guarantees should be the independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty, and constitutional order of the Federal Republic.
- The guarantees should continue in force for as long as either community considers necessary their continuation.

Under the heading of **Constitutional Agreements,** the significant clause stated that **the Greek Cypriot side proposes a composition of and representation in the organs which, while assuring adequate and effective participation, also permits the machinery of government to continue operating and not to be paralyzed in the event of disagreement between community political representatives**-a clause aimed at eliminating the right of the Turkish Cypriots to veto governmental decision which could be harmful to them.

## TURKISH REBUTTAL AND FURTHER TALKS

All the meeting of February 13, 1989 the Turkish Cypriot side submitted a memorandum presenting its views regarding Vassiliou's **Outline Proposals**. It pointed out that **in essence the Greek Cypriot paper is nothing but a repetition of views and arguments which have led previous efforts by the United Nation's Secretary-General into an impasse**. The Turkish Cypriot memorandum also underlined the fact that according to Vassiliou's proposals, the Turkish Cypriots would have even fewer rights than the Constitution of 1960.

On April 6, President Denktaş and Vassiliou met with Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar in New York to keep him abreast of the negotiations, which had taken place during the second round of the intercommunal talks in Nicosia. At that meeting, the two leaders also agreed to prepare a draft outline of an overall agreement during a third round of the intercommunal talks, which was being planned.

The third round of the intercommunal talks lasted from May 9 to June 10, 1989. It was Denktaş' understanding that the projected draft outline would be prepared by both leaders in a series of face-to-face meetings and by the process of direct negotiation. Therefore, he was dismayed to learn that this was not what the U.N. representatives had in mind. In spite of his objections, only three of the meetings, which were scheduled, involved direct negotiation. The rest of the time was taken up by what became a series of proximity talks in which the U.N. representatives held meetings with two sides.

This round of intercommunal talks was punctuated by yet another fruitless meeting of the two leaders in New York on July 29, 1989.

A fourth round of the intercommunal talks, which was supposed to start shortly after the meeting of June 29, 1990, did not materialize for any chance of creating **an atmosphere of mutual confidence** (which had been the stated intention of both Denktaş and Vassiliou at the Geneva Conference) had been steadily eroded by the repeated border violations that were being orchestrated by the Greek Cypriot administration, by Vassiliou's continued diplomatic and economic warfare against the Turkish Cypriots, (for details see Appendix I), and by Vassiliou's efforts to strengthen the offensive capability of the Greek Cypriot armed forces (for details see Appendix II).

To complicate matters further, on July 25, 1989, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar made a procedural error that threatened to jeopardize the impartial mission of good offices, which had been entrusted to him. He unilaterally submitted a **set of ideas** to both sides, which he described as **food-for-thought**. He claimed that his suggestions were **non-binding**, yet the document looked very much like a formal set of proposals to be used as a basis for future negotiations. To Denktaş, who was still upset by the intrusion of Perez de Cuellar's representatives in the third round of the intercommunal talks in Nicosia, Perez de Cuellar's **food-for-thought** proposals came as a complete shock; for the Secretary-General's action seemed to confirm the Turkish Cypriots' worst fear about the U.N.-namely that it was assuming the role of negotiating partner in the talks, thus violating the principle (accepted by all parties

concerned) that a solution to the Cyprus problem is to be reached only by means of direct negotiations between the two governments on the island. Therefore, he at once protested that the agreed-upon procedure for the drafting of proposals has been disregarded and that the Secretary-General did not have the authority to present proposals of his own. On the other hand, Vassiliou was delighted by what he perceived to be a widening rift between Perez de Cuellar and Denktas̄, and he declared that he was willing to recognize the right of the Secretary-General to make proposals. Perez de Cuellar had the good sense not to press the issue. In the end, he declared the **food-for-thought** proposals **null and void**, and invited Denktas̄ to come to New York in October. But Vassiliou continued to exploit the misunderstanding by proclaiming everywhere that his acceptance of the **food-for-thought** proposals as a basis for further negotiations showed that he was forward-looking and a man of peace, where as Denktas̄'s rejection of these proposals indicated that he lived in the past and preferred to be president of a part of Cyprus than to see the island reunited.

There is good reason for President Denktas̄'s extreme reluctance to accept the participation of outsiders in the negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus problem: when Archbishop Makarios dismantled the Republic of Cyprus, he argued that the Zurich-London Accords, which had led to its foundation, had been imposed upon him by outsiders and, when the Akritas Plan was drafted, it contained a clause urging Greek Cypriot leaders to maintain that the Accords were **not the result of the free will of contending parties**. Denktas̄ obviously does not want to give the Greek Cypriots the opportunity of ever again using such an argument.

But there is also a reason why Denktas̄ is suspicious of U.N. interference in the talks in particular: the U.N. has generally favored the Greek Cypriot side. To understand this, we must consider the impact of Greek Cypriot propaganda upon the world at large.

## **IMPACT OF GREEK CYPRIOT PROPAGANDA**

For the Greek Cypriots, world recognition has been an enormous asset. They have exploited this unique advantage by deluging the world with ant-Turkish propaganda. At the same time, they have done everything in their power to prevent the Turkish Cypriots from presenting their case to the world community. In this, they have been especially successful in the United States, for they have been able to count upon the full support of the rich, influential, and well-organized Greek lobby. As a result, there has been much intimidation of the media in that country. A good example of this type of pressure was the Greek and Greek Cypriot reaction to an article about tourism in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in a recent issue of **Travel and Leisure**.

Abuse was heaped upon the courageous editor, and the Greek government threatened to withdraw its advertising from the magazine should it ever again publish such an article.

World recognition for the Greek Cypriot government has also enabled it to forge a special relationship with the United Nations. In former times, it was regarded as a great advantage for a person to have **the ear** of the Shah or the Sultan in the Middle East. The fact that the Greek Cypriot state is the only state in Cyprus to be represented at the United Nations has given the Greek Cypriots a similar advantage, for it has given them a large measure of control over the information which that body receives concerning events in Cyprus. Moreover, it has bestowed upon the information disseminated by the Greek Cypriots an official imprimatur.

The Greek Cypriots were so skilful in manipulating the United Nations that they gradually transformed it into a kind of clique. When Makarios overthrew the Republic of Cyprus and sponsored widespread acts of terrorism against the Turkish Cypriot population, there was not one word of criticism from United Nations headquarters in New York, and when the Turkish army, in keeping with its treaty obligations, intervened to topple the Sampson dictatorship and protect the Turkish Cypriot community, it was treated as an invading force. U.N. resolutions adopted in 1974 show how easily duped this international body was by the Greek Cypriot propaganda machine.

For example, Security Council Resolutions 354 and 360 both call for the withdrawal of foreign (ex. Turkish) troops from the island, but not for the disbanding of the illegal Greek Cypriot National Guard and paramilitary organizations, such as EOKA-B, which undoubtedly would have indulged in mass slaughter of the Turkish Cypriots had Turkish troops been withdrawn. Meanwhile, General Assembly Resolution 3212 (XXIX) reiterated the fallacy that **the constitutional system of the Republic of Cyprus concerns the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities** a truly preposterous statement since the **constitutional system** in question was unconstitutional. It also recommended that **all the refugees should return to their homes in safety** impossibility since it was the lack of safety that had caused the mass migration of Turkish Cypriots to the North in the first place.

Later U.N. resolutions condemning the Turkish Cypriots for having formed their administration in 1975 and their own independent state in 1983 overlooked the fact that the Turkish Cypriots had been stateless and deprived of all government services by the internationally recognized government of Cyprus since 1963. Finally, it should be borne in mind that on several occasions in 1964 and 1974, U.N. troops in Cyprus forcibly disarmed Turkish Cypriot villagers, who were then slaughtered by the Greek Cypriots.

It is; therefore, clear why President Denktaş did not view with favor U.N. interference in the Cyprus negotiations and why he was so alarmed by Perez de Cuellar's "**food for thought**" proposals. Only the Secretary-General's prompt withdrawal of his proposals saved the U.N. sponsored talks from coming to an abrupt end and preserved the credibility of his mission of good office. Suitably reassured, the Turkish Cypriot leader then accepted Perez de Cuellar's invitation to come to New York for further consultations.

## **TURKISH DECLARATION OF INTENT**

While in New York, on October 11, 1989, Denktaş presented a “**Declaration of Intent**” to Peres de Cuellar. It consisted of an **Explanatory Note** a “**Draft Outline of a Comprehensive Settlement in Cyprus**”, a “**Draft Joint Declaration**” and a section headed, “**Implementation of the Agreed Solution on the Establishment of a Federation in Cyprus**”. A complete text of the “**Draft Joint Declaration**” follows:

**The Turkish Cypriot leader and the Greek Cypriot leader, acting on behalf of their respective peoples to whom sovereignty was jointly transferred in 1960 and who had, as co-founding partners, established together the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus;**

**Bearing in mind the experiences and sufferings of the past and determined to ensure their non-recurrence:**

**Willing to work towards the establishment of a federation that will be bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspect and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspect:**

- 1. Having agreed that the comprehensive settlement will be approved through separate referenda by the two peoples in accordance with their inherent right to self-determination as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.**
- 2. Acknowledge the distinct cultural, religious and national identity of each people whose human rights, including political, economic, social and cultural rights, should be safeguarded under a comprehensive settlement.**
- 3. Express their conviction that:**
- 4. The relationship of the two peoples should be based on mutual respect for each other’s existence, integrity and political equality,**
- 5. Each side should actively work to bring about such a relationship,**
- 6. The two peoples should peacefully co-exist and enjoy security without being confronted with the danger of the use of force or the threat of the use of force or violence of any kind,**
- 7. Underline the historic necessity of following a policy of friendship and cooperation with their respective motherlands and of promoting peaceful and friendly relations with all countries in conformity with the principles of non-alignment;**
- 8. Pledge to work towards the drafting of an integrated and comprehensive settlement as a whole on the basis of which the two sides will undertake further negotiations in order to prepare a peace agreement and the subsequent arrangements for a federation by taking into account the foregoing considerations**
- 9. Agree to align their positions with the peaceful aim of the current negotiating process under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary-General, to change accordingly all contradictory practices and to refrain from any political, military, economic, commercial and cultural action which would, in essence, impair the efforts for a negotiated settlement.**

When he returned home, President Denktaş tried to phone President Vassiliou to launch a new series of talks in Nicosia **“for clearing the shrubs and defining intentions”** but the Greek Cypriot leader refused to come to the phone.

On December 4, 1989, Denktaş went back to New York for further consultations with Perez de Cuellar. During the months of November and December 1989, Perez de Cuellar also met twice with Vassiliou. But nothing came out of these meetings because Vassiliou failed to produce his own **“Draft Joint Declaration”**.

On November 6, 1974, Glafkos Clerides, who briefly held the position of president of the Greek Cypriot state after the fall of Nicos Sampson, made the insightful remark that Greek Cypriot thinking before the Turkish intervention had been based on false assumptions, terrible mistakes, and illusions. The tragedy is that this type of thinking has persisted, and to such an extent that even such ostensibly independent-minded and pragmatic man as Vassiliou has been unable to break free of its stranglehold. This was already apparent on March 30, 1988, when Alan Cowell, special correspondent of **The New York Times**, wrote: **Before coming to power, Mr. Vassiliou had adopted a conciliatory position, fanning hopes among some that a new face and new ideas might invigorate the effort to reach an inter-communal settlement. But after he won, Mr. Vassiliou reverted to longstanding Greek Cypriot position.**

When Vassiliou discussed his proposals in a speech to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on January 31, 1990, three members of the British House of Commons who were present, Keith Speed, Andrew Faulds and Michael Knowles, wrote a report that contained the following apt remarks:

When Mr. Vassiliou was elected, we hoped that he would bring a new realism to the affairs of Cyprus, but we have been disappointed. This speech shows that, like his predecessors, he does not understand that the behavior of the Greek Cypriots towards the Turkish Cypriots has made it impossible to go forward on the basis of trust and confidence.

Mr. Vassiliou’s insistence that the Turkish troops must leave demonstrates that he is not willing to understand the fundamental concerns of the Turkish Cypriots. He expects them to be satisfied with his assurances, with written safeguards, and with international guarantees, but is well aware that the 1960 Constitution guaranteed their rights and was ignored, that U.N. troops were meant to protect to protect them but failed, that international guarantees likewise failed, and that the only factor which saved them at the eleventh hour was the Turkish army.

His proposal for demilitarization looks superficially reasonable, but it designed to put the Turkish Cypriots back into the position they were in 1963, at the mercy of superior Greek Cypriot numbers and of their superior economic power. He must know that even the entire might of the British army was unable to disarm Greek Cypriot paramilitaries and that the Turkish Cypriots have no confidence that this would be done.

### PART III

#### The Man of Maratha (MURATAGALI)

In order to discourage international recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots maintained that the Turkish Cypriots are mere ethnic minority inflicted with the virus of nationalism. The Turkish Cypriots, they argue, do not have the right of self-determination; therefore, they do not have the right of secession. They then warn the leaders of the many countries that have genuine minority problems that for them to recognize the Turkish Cypriot state would only encourage their own restive minorities to rebel.

But the Turkish Cypriots insist that they have never been a mere minority; they were the co-founders of the partnership state known as the Republic of Cyprus—a status, which was recognized in the Zurich-London Accords. They point out that the British government as a union of two nationalities, each of which would be endowed with the right of self-determination, conceived the Republic of Cyprus. As the British colonial secretary, Alan Lennox Boyd, said in 1956: **It will be the purpose of Her Majesty's Government to ensure that any exercise of self-determination should be effected in such a manner that Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, shall, in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status. In other words, Her Majesty's Government recognizes that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options** (statement made in the House of Commons, December 19, 1956). On June 26, 1958, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan described these assurances as “pledges”. No less an authority than Professor Elihu Lauterpacht, director of the Research Centre for International Law at the University of Cambridge, has concluded that “*de facto* acceptance of the illegal Greek Cypriot government by the international community could not, and did not, in any way... deprived the Turkish Cypriot community, to the enjoyment of its right of self-determination” (*Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus: Opinion, p.4*).

That the Greek Cypriots believe themselves endowed with the right of self-determination, there is no doubt. It was clearly spelled out in the Akritas Plan (Clause A/e0, which stated: **“In order to be able to exercise the right of self-determination fully and without hindrance, we must get rid of the Agreements (i.e., the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, etc.) And of those provisions of the Constitution which inhibit the free and unbridled expression of the will of the people and which carry dangers of external intervention”**.

The refusal of the Greek Cypriots to recognize that their former partners in the Republic of Cyprus have similar right today forms a major barrier in the negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus problem because there cannot be federation without there being two sovereign states enjoying equal rights.

Thus, the Greek Cypriots' claim that the Turkish Cypriots do not have the right of self-determination, which, at first, was used solely to discourage other nations from recognizing the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, has come to jeopardize the very negotiations which would prevent a final split of the island into two separate states.

In an article that appeared in the *International Herald Tribune* (issue of February 19, 1990), Vassiliou shows the extent to which his thoughts are still at variance with those of the Turkish Cypriots—especially concerning the question of self-determination. He starts by repeating his standard assertion that **“the Cyprus problem is essentially one of the occupation of sovereign territory of one state by the armed forces of another—in this**



case Turkey, which invaded and occupied more than one-third of the Republic in 1974". He then lambastes the Turkish Cypriots for claiming the right of self-determination. **"Nothing good can come when one ethnic group seeks prosperity and progress at the expense of another (and of the border international order) under the banner of self-determination,"** he writes, and he predicts that the outcome of future peace talks in New York will **"say much about the question of whether states with more than one ethnic group can survive as unified entities within secure borders, or whether they are bound to fragment, with each community claiming the right to secede as the only way to safeguard its interests"**. It is not astonishing, therefore, that the negotiations have reached an impasse.

Perez de Cuellar invited both Denktaş and Vassiliou to meet with him in New York in late February 1990. The meeting got off to shaky start. In his opening statement on February 26, the Secretary-General began well enough by stating: **"The mandate given to me by the Security Council makes it clear that my mission of good offices is with the two communities. My mandate is also explicit that the participation of the two communities in this process is on an equal footing. The solution that is being sought is thus one that must be decided upon by, and must be acceptable to, both communities. It must also respect the cultural, religious, social, and linguistic identity of each community."** But the Secretary-General then went on once more to present what looked very much like a formal set of proposals. Again Denktaş protested arguing that he had come to New York for direct talks with Vassiliou and not to debate issues raised by Perez de Cuellar.

President Denktaş then read a list of **"talking Points"** (for their full text, see appendix III). In this document, Denktaş began by pointing out that **"in order to make sense, the talks should be firmly anchored in reality and should take into account the political facts and circumstances in Cyprus"**. To make this possible, the relationship between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots must be **"redefined"** and **"reoriented"**. Vassiliou has to recognize that Denktaş and he are **"the elected leaders of the two peoples of Cyprus"**. Whereas Vassiliou **"represents the Greek Cypriots, and no one but the Greek Cypriots,"** Denktaş pointed out, he himself represents the Turkish Cypriot People and has **"no claims to represent anyone else"** In other words, **"the Greek Cypriot leadership should... come to terms with the fact that it is not the government of the Turkish Cypriots and has no authority to so present itself."**

As regards international recognition, Denktaş observed that although **"the Greek Cypriots regard international recognition as their most precious possession,"** it should be made quite clear that **"the international community did not grant recognition to a Greek Cypriot state in Cyprus in 1960."** In any case he added, **"Every silently acknowledges that it (Vassiliou's state) is nothing but a Greek Cypriot entity and that there is a corresponding Turkish Cypriot entity. This is why we are having meeting today."**

**Denktaş asserted that the talks could only have two possible outcomes:**

- 1. "1. If the negotiation process is successful, there can be a new partnership...**
- 2. Based on political equality, power-sharing and equal and effective**
- 3. Participation.**
  - a. And the North will continue to exist, hopefully under peaceful conditions**
  - b. The TRNC will receive the international recognition, which it deserves.**
- 4. Denktaş admitted that he has "the most serious misgivings about the preparations and policy statements of the Greek Cypriot leadership, which indicate that it is inclining towards a military option."** He claimed that his approach to a solution of the Cyprus problem precludes **"all use of force or violence,"** and he urged Vassiliou to join him

**“in a solemn written declaration”** that both sides would **“renounce the use of force”** in the Cyprus dispute.

But, at the same time, Denktaş indicated that he opposed the complete demilitarization of the island, at least **“in the self-serving sense the Greek Cypriot propaganda has misused this concept.”** He recalled that **“for all practical purposes, the joint Republic of 1960 was already demilitarized,”** but that **“it was the Greek Cypriots who militarized the island, making use of EOKA terrorists and forming so-called secret armies and an unconstitutional military force”.**

Finally, Denktaş urged Vassiliou to change his hostile attitude towards the Turkish Cypriots, and suggested that both states in Cyprus **“have peaceful relations and for that purpose...adopt a non-confrontational and non-adverbial approach towards each other.”**

When Denktaş completed his presentation, Vassiliou declared that he had not come to New York to be criticized by the Turkish Cypriot leader, but to discuss the Secretary-Generals proposals. When Vassiliou was reminded (even by Perez de Cuellar) that the Secretary-General had not presented any formal proposals that could be used as a basis for all talks, he accused Denktaş of being out of order for trying to introduce new subjects that did not fall within the parameters previously agreed to for future negotiations. Denktaş maintained that there could be no meaningful discussions if the relationship between the two leaders remained unqualified. **“Our exercise is to make a new constitution as two politically equal neighbors,”** he explained. **“So, it is important for me to find out how Mr. Vassiliou sees us”.**

The rest of the meeting, which lasted until March 2, was taken up by a heated debate between Denktaş and Vassiliou as to whether or not the Turkish Cypriots have the right of self-determination. The discussion covered much familiar ground, but Denktaş finally said that a federation between two equal partners can only be achieved by the free will exercised by each partner, and that without self-determination there cannot be a federation. Therefore, if Vassiliou continued to insist that the Turkish Cypriots do not have the right of self-determination, there was no point in continuing the meeting.

On February 26, President Denktaş released the following statement to the press:

**“As one of the equal parties, we have come to discuss frankly and substantively the situation in Cyprus. We have detailed and constructive proposals on how we can move towards a comprehensive settlement. The starting point is fundamentally new relationship between the two peoples in Cyprus-the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. We want a non-confrontational relationship. We want to become good neighbors and partners in a new political association. The Greek Cypriots should reciprocate.”**

**“We have had no common institutions and virtually no ties at any level for the past 26 years. This is very long time. We have now two clear alternatives before us. We can either reach agreement to move towards a federal relationship or we can peacefully coexist as binary states. In either case, we have a long way to go, but we have to decide now. The Turkish Cypriots have been genuinely striving for the achievement of the first option until now, but this has not yet brought us a settlement. We have to break out of this impasse. The two peoples should be able to see into the future. For us, there are no other options. The Greek Cypriots should make up their minds.”**

**“Historic developments are taking place in Europe, based on the right to self-determination, the right of each people to freely determine their political status. The**

**Turkish Cypriots want nothing more and nothing less. We want power sharing and cooperation on equal terms. We want to protect our freedom, security and integrity as a politically equal and separate people with different culture.**

**“There is no single representative government in Cyprus and no homogenous Cypriot nation, but two sovereign peoples identified on the basis of ethnic origin, language, cultural tradition and religion, whose partnership status was recognized in the 1960 agreements. The Turkish Cypriots want to resolve the Cyprus question through exclusively peaceful means, once and for all. The two sides should, accordingly, commit themselves to peaceful coexistence and the creation of a new relationship.”**

Denktaş also submitted to Perez de Cuellar a 27-page **“Draft Outline of a Comprehensive Settlement in Cyprus.”**

Because of President Vassiliou’s intransigence regarding the question of self-determination and his refusal to even read the papers, which President Denktaş had submitted, no appreciable progress was made in the negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus problem at the New York meeting of February-March 1990. But President Denktaş’s enormously vital and creative performance at the meeting, especially when compared with President Vassiliou’s tepid and uninspiring performance, seems to have made a deep impression in United Nation’s circle. This was reflected in a formal statement delivered by Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar on March 2, 1990, which pointed out that **“the objectives of the exercise of good offices is a new constitution for the State of Cyprus,”** and, therefore, contradicts the Greek Cypriots’ assertion that what has to be done is simply to amend the constitution of 1960 (which would recognize the validity of its present, illegally amended form). Also significant is that Perez de Cuellar, in his **“Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Office in Cyprus”** of March 8, 1990, stated, for the first time, that the relationship between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots **“is not one of majority, but one of two communities in the state of Cyprus”**.

The Security Council as a whole was, apparently, also impressed by Denktaş’s performance in New York, for its resolution 649 of March 12, 1990, showed a marked change in attitude towards the Turkish Cypriots. The full text of the resolution follows:

***The Security Council, having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 8 March 1990 (S/21183) on the recent meeting between the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus and on his assesment of the current situation;***

**Recalling its relevant resolution on Cyprus:**

***Recalling the statement of the President of the Security Council of 22 February 1990 (S/21160) calling upon the leaders of the two communities to demonstrate the necessary goodwill and flexibility and to co-operate with the Seretary-General so that the talks will result in a major step forward toward the resolution of the Cyprus problem:***

***Expressing its regret that, in the more than 25 years since the establishment of UNFICYP, it has not been possible to achieve a negotiated settlement of all aspects of the Cyprus problem, Concerned that at the recent meeting in New York it has not been possible to achieve results in arriving at an agreed outline of an overall agreement:***

1. ***Reaffirms*** in particular its resolution 367 (1975) as well as its support for the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements between the leaders of the two communities in which they pledged themselves to establish a bi-communal Federal Republic of Cyprus that will safeguard it independence, sovereignty,

- territorial integrity and non-alignment and exclude union in whole or in part with any other country and any form of partition or secession;
2. *Express* its full support for the current effort of the Secretary-General in carrying out his mission of good offices concerning Cyprus;
  3. *Calls upon* the leaders of the two communities to pursue their efforts to reach freely a mutual acceptable solution providing for the establishment of a federation that will be bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects in line with the present resolution and their 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements, and to co-operate, on an equal footing, with the Secretary-General in completing, in the first instance and on an urgent basis, an outline of an overall agreement, as agreed in July 1989;
  4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good office in order to achieve the two communities by making suggestion to facilitate the discussions;
  5. *Calls on* parties concerned to refrain from any action that could aggravate the situation;
  6. *Decide* to remain actively seized of the situation and the current effort;
  7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to inform the Council in his report due by 31 May 1990 of the progress made in resuming the intensive talks and in developing an agreed outline of an overall agreement in line with the present resolution.
  8. To the Turkish Cypriots, this resolution represents a great improvement over previous United Nations resolutions concerning Cyprus. There are no more references to present “Government of Cyprus, to “ occupation forces,” and to “Turkish settlers” changing the population ratio between the two communities on the island. A very positive sign is that by calling upon the leaders of the two communities to “reach freely a mutually acceptable solution” and “to co-operate, on an equal footing, with the Secretary-General,” the resolution concedes that each side in the conflict has the freedom to determine its own future and that the two leaders enjoy an equal status in the eyes of the world community. Moreover, the fourth paragraph, by bemoaning the fact that, “in the more than 25 years since the establishment of UNFICYP, it has not been possible to achieve a negotiated settlement of all aspects of the Cyprus problem,” clearly recognizes that the Cyprus problem did not start with the Turkish intervention of 1974, but with the events of 1964. Finally, item 4 contradicts the claim of the Greek Cypriots that the Secretary-General has been empowered to make proposals by mentioning only “suggestions.

In its comments on resolution 649, the British publication, *Turkey Confidential* (Issue No.8), makes the following observations:

**“Not only does this resolution dispose finally of the claim that the Turkish Cypriots are an ethnic minority, and should therefore be content with minority rights, but it also recognizes that their consent is essential to any solution. This is equivalent to giving them the right to veto any proposals, which they do not like. True, the resolution stops short of recognizing full self-determination for the Turkish Cypriots, since the solution would have to be sought in the framework of a federal Cyprus, but as equal partners in the federation, they could block any arrangements which would weaken their hold on their zone. The UNSC resolution thus meets the main demand of the Turkish Cypriots—that they should be either own master in their own part of the island.**

In mid-1990, a new threat to the negotiations arose. Only July 4, 1990, the Greek Cypriot government applied for membership in the European Communities on behalf of the illegitimate Cyprus state. The fact that the Turkish Cypriots were not consulted about the move clearly indicates that the Greek Cypriot government still totally disregards their needs and aspirations. In an article published in the *Turkish Daily News* (issue of July 19, 1990),

President Denktas appropriately asked: **“How can we pretend to be talking on a basis of political equality to the Greek Cypriots as our future partners when our consent is not deemed necessary for EC membership- a membership which implies (as the Greek press openly admits) political and economic integration with Greece at our expense?”** He pointed out that **“ the Akritas Plan is being implemented and the EC countries are now being used as a tool in that direction.”** Therefore, he concluded, the Greek Cypriot application was a **“fatal blow”** to the talks.

On July 12, 1990, President Denktas wrote a letter to Gianni de Michelis, the president in office of the Council of European Communities, informing him why the Turkish Cypriots were strenuously opposed to the Greek Cypriot application for membership in the EC, and he asked President de Michelis to present these objections to the EC Council of Foreign Ministers- the body to which the Greek Cypriot application had been submitted.

On September 3, 1990, President Denktas sent President de Michelis a supplementary note, which raised future objections to the Greek Cypriot application. But, on September 17, 1990, the EC Council of Foreign Ministers nonetheless forwarded without discussion the Greek Cypriot application to the EC’s Executive Commission for the approval.

It would be ironic if the EC, which prides itself on being a unifying force in European affairs, would play a decisive role in bringing about the final division of Cyprus into completely independent states.

## **THE MAN FROM MARATHA KNEELING ON THE GROUND**

There is a famous photograph taken in Maratha, on September 1, 1974. It shows an old man kneeling on the ground. He seems emotionally flayed. He raises his arms in horror at the scene in front of him: the mutilated bodies of his wife and three children, unearthed several days after having been slaughtered by Greek Cypriot armed men. This photograph is

symbolic of all the suffering that the Greek Cypriots inflicted upon their Turkish Cypriot neighbors.

Wherever President Denktaş goes, the man of Maratha follows in his footsteps, and whenever the Turkish Cypriot head of state sits a bargaining table, the man of Maratha sits next to him-unseen and silent, yet real nonetheless and highly eloquent. He does not demand vengeance. All he asks for is that his people be allowed to live in peace-and this is the central issue as far as the Turkish Cypriots are concerned. The Turkish Cypriots would be both foolish and suicidal should they accept any solution to the Cyprus problem that would offer them less security than they now enjoy, and thus far no Greek Cypriot leader has been willing to face this simple, but fundamental, truth.

There is, however, still a glimmer of hope. Though the man of Maratha is nowhere to be found in Southern Cyprus, some people have begun to sense his presence at United Nations headquarters in New York.

### The Greek Cypriot Embargo Against the Turkish Cypriot People in all Spheres

As we have seen, President Kyprianou initiated a policy whose purposes were the strangulation of the Turkish Cypriot economy by means of an embargo, and the isolation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the world community. President Vassiliou retained this policy in spite of the fact that at the Geneva summit meeting of August 1988, he promised to do his best to foster “an atmosphere of mutual confidence” between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots.

To this day, if a ship calls at one of the ports in Northern Cyprus, it is blacklisted and the captain is prosecuted if he calls later at a port in the South.

Because all ports and airports in Northern Cyprus have been declared “illegal” by the Greek Cypriot government, no direct air services have been established between any foreign countries –with the exception of Turkey- and the Ercan International Airport in the North. Any airline contemplating the establishment of such services is strongly discouraged from so doing by means of threats and warnings. On March 20, 1989, the Greek Cypriot authorities arrested sports official from South Korea, who had landed in the South by mistake on his way to serve as a referee at the International Tai-kwon-do contest in the North.

We have already mentioned the incident involving the article on Northern Cyprus in the May 10, 1989 issue of *Travel and Leisure*. Another incident, which highlighted the Greek Cypriots’ attempts to discourage tourism in the Northern Cyprus, occurred in February 1989. It started as the London Regional Transport Authority displayed Turkish Cypriot travel posters in several underground stations in the British capital. The Authority was at once warned that if it did not withdraw the posters, **the stations showing the posters would be bombed**. As a result of these threats, the posters were immediately removed.

All of these measures have been counterproductive, inasmuch as their only effect has been to harden the resolve of the Turkish Cypriots. In a report dated May 7, 1987, the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee recognized that fact. It correctly stated, “The Greek Cypriot Government’s policy of seeking to impose an embargo on much of the Turkish Cypriots’ trade and communication with the outside world can not contribute to a settlement”.

### Military Build-up in Southern Cyprus

Shortly after his election in February 1988, President Vassiliou decided to implement the recommendations for an increase in military expenditures made by the Defense Committee of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives in a report, which had been submitted to the Greek Cypriot government on January 25, 1988. Accordingly, the following allocations were approved by the Cypriot legislature.

1. **The sum of 180 millions of Cyprus pound -360 millions of US dollars- to be used for immediate arms purchases;**
2. **The sum of 145 millions of Cyprus pounds – 290 millions of US dollars- to be entrusted to the fund for Strengthening Defense, and used for subsequent arms purchases.**

At the same time, it was decided that a further sum of 360 million Cyprus pounds – 720 millions of US dollars- would be raised by the Greek Cypriot government during the following three years to rearm the Greek Cypriot National Guard, which comprises 21,000 men on active duty and an additional 64,000 men in the reserves.

Thus, there has been a major military build up in Southern Cyprus during the presidency of George Vassiliou. Already in September 1989, a spokesman for the Greek Cypriot government boasted:

*“Everyone in this country knows that in one-and-a-half years [Vassiliou’s presidency] what has been done {for defense} is more than has been done during ten years of the previous administration-see Greek Cypriot newspaper, ***The Cyprus Mail***, September 20, 1989.*

In an interview published by the Greek Cypriot Daily Alithia of September 24, 1989 issue, Andreas Aloneftis, the Greek Cypriot minister of defense, spoke in glowing terms of the rapid expansion and development of the Greek National Guard, and he admitted that the military build-up has an aggressive purpose. “At the first opportunity we get,” he declared, the Greek National Guard will attack and regain by force of arms our occupied lands.”

### **President Denktas’s “Talking Points” of February 26, 1990**

“I wish to thank the Secretary-General for this opening statement. I would like to make a few comments myself from the Turkish Cypriot perspective. I believe we need to have a clear understanding on what we are trying to do at the moment.

“In the presence of the Secretary-General, under whose auspices we are meeting today, I wish to place on records my profound regret because of the campaign of disinformation undertaken by Mr. Vassiliou personally on the eve of our meeting. His statement in the Council of Europe and his article in the *International Herald Tribune*, published on 18 February, were not the acts of a person who really in detail to the distortions of Mr. Vassiliou point by point, by just now I want him to know how much harm he has done by indulging in such a counterproductive exercise. He has made our task all the more difficult, and I hope that this was not his true purpose.

“I think there is general agreement that we are not going to have talks just for the sake of talks. The Secretary-General has stressed this point many times. We have done the same. We want to find a way out of this vicious circle that has not brought a settlement to Cyprus. That is why we have been calling for a meaningful dialogue. We have to start talking the same

language, which we are not at the moment, as clearly demonstrated by the statements and writings of Mr. Vassiliou. This is essential if the Greek Cypriot side intends to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement with us, instead of regarding the talks as a tactical device to involve third parties.

'In order to make sense, the talks should be firmly anchored in reality and should take into account the political facts and circumstances in Cyprus. As the Secretary-General has stressed in his latest report to the Security Council, the success of the negotiations depends, to a large extent, on the message that the two sides convey to each other. The message, which we are receiving from Mr. Vassiliou does not correspond to the image that the world was made to believe and is not one that can lead the negotiations to success. He is using the same language and methods that have created and perpetuated the Cyprus question.

“While talking about federation, If the two sides in Cyprus are unable to establish peaceful relations and cooperation now, how can we persuade our peoples that this will come by itself under a political association? We cannot, in fact, move towards a settlement by evading this problem while paying lip service to the notion of a new partnership in an atmosphere of make-believe.

“We have been trying to impress upon the Greek Cypriot side that a fundamental change is required for a peaceful deal. We have to define and reorient our relationship and adopt our thinking and perceptions to the existing realities for the sake of peace and reconciliation. Without talking this major step, we do not believe that a political association can be possible, even if we manage to work out a most beautiful paper agreement.

At this stage, I want to convey to Mr. Vassiliou, as simply and as clearly as I can, our perception of the present situation and our thinking on a settlement. We are here as elected leaders of the two peoples of Cyprus. Mr. Vassiliou represents the Greek Cypriots, and no one but the Greek Cypriots. He is elected by Greek Cypriots only and presides over a government and administration that safeguard Greek Cypriot interest exclusively. He is the head of a Greek Cypriot State, which will be one of the constituent republics in the new partnership.

I represent the Turkish Cypriot people. I have been elected by the Turkish Cypriots and I have no claims to represent anyone else. I am the head of the Turkish Cypriot State in the North Cyprus, which will also be one of the two constituent republics within a new political association in Cyprus. In the month ahead, we are going to have parliamentary and presidential elections in TRNC which will give the chance to the Turkish Cypriot people to renew their mandate to the representatives of their free choice whom they will once again democratically authorize to act and speak on their behalf.

The Greek Cypriots are not and never were the government of the Turkish Cypriots. They have no such authority and they know it. The Turkish Cypriots are not the subjects of a Greek Cypriot State and surely the exercise we are engaged in, does not envisage our becoming their subjects. Whatever rights the Greek Cypriots have in the South, the Turkish Cypriots equally have them in the North. We can decide about a common future jointly, but the Greek Cypriots cannot decide the future of the Turkish Cypriots by themselves. Leadership should be able to come to terms with the fact that they are not the government of the Turkish Cypriots, that they do not represent the Turkish Cypriots and have no authority to do so. This is the historical, political and legal fact, and its recognition as such is a fundamental requirement for the talks about a federal partnership. There has been a joint state or government embracing both peoples for over a quarter of a century. These two peoples do not have even single common institution. This reality is of vital importance in defining the starting point of a political association.



In order to move towards a common interpretation of the situation in Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot

The Greek Cypriots regard international recognition as their most precious possession. In fact, the international community did not grant recognition to a Greek Cypriot state in Cyprus in 1960. On the contrary, Greek Cypriot ambitions to decide the fate of Cyprus by themselves were clearly rejected on more than one occasion. It was on the basis of the situation that independence based on the consent of both peoples then became possible. There is today a discrepancy between the actual political situation in Cyprus upon which a new partnership has to be based, and the untenable claims put forward by the Greek Cypriot administration in the South. The anomaly can be redressed through peaceful change in one of the two directions:

1. If the negotiating process is successful, there can be a new partnership, which can represent both peoples. The Greek Cypriots should of course recognize that under a federal arrangement we shall not be creating a new Greek State or a Greek-dominated State, but a Greek/Turkish partnership based on political equality, power sharing and equal and effective participation.
2. If the negotiating process is unsuccessful, the two republics in the South and North will continue to exist, hopefully under peaceful conditions, and the TRNC will receive the international recognition, which it deserves.

Despite the recognition that the Greek Cypriot side enjoys, everyone silently acknowledges that it is nothing but a Greek Cypriot entity and that there is a corresponding Turkish Cypriot entity.

This is why we are having this meeting today. We regard the present situation as a grave injustice to our people, who have lasted for too long, and expect the international community to put an end to it. We hope that the Greek Cypriots will have the wisdom to reconsider their position and give up their untenable claims, so as to remove a major obstacle in the path of the negotiations.

There is no reasonable option other than the two, which I have just mentioned. I wish to underline that we see both of these alternatives as viable options. The Turkish Cypriots have been genuinely striving for the achievement of the first option until now, but this has not yet brought us a settlement. We have to break out of this impasse.

In our approach we preclude all use of force or violence. However, we have the most serious misgivings about the preparations and policy statements of the Greek Cypriot leadership, which indicate that they are inclining towards a military option. The Secretary-General will bear witness to what is said here today. If the Greek Cypriots ever attempt to change by force the status quo, which was the result of their actions, they will not only inflict great pain and suffering to both peoples, but they will also be committing another historical blunders. The ruling circles in the South are exactly the same people who have either used or organized the use of force and violence against the Turkish Cypriots in the past. There are minor exceptions, but there are also new recruits who wish to rely on military option. I would like to believe that Mr. Vassiliou is fully conscious of the dangers involved in their present course of a military build-up in the South Cyprus. We do not and cannot accept the implausible excuse put forward for justifying the Greek Cypriot rearmament. Nor can demilitarization; in the self-serving sense the Greek Cypriot propaganda has misused this concept, be the appropriate means for eliminating the danger of a resort to the military option. For all practical purposes, the joint Republic of 1960 was already demilitarized, but it was the Greek Cypriots who militarized the island, making use of EOKA terrorists and forming so-called secret louder than words. I want to tell Mr. Vassiliou that the actions of the Greek Cypriot leadership have convinced my people that there is change in the Greek leadership mentality and that the Greek Cypriot will use their new military capabilities

against them at the first opportunity, as repeatedly stated by Mr. Aloneftis and others. That is why I call on Mr. Vassiliou to renounce the use of force on behalf of his people and join me in a solemn written declaration. Otherwise, whatever argument may be advanced, the doubts of my people will only deepen and we shall have to consider what legitimate steps we can take to counter the growing threat directed at us from the South. I need hardly repeat that the Greek Cypriot actions do not create the necessary atmosphere conducive to negotiations for a federation. Up to now, the Greek Cypriot side has not responded to any of our concerns or efforts on this score. Mr. Vassiliou has done everything to deepen the mistrust between the two peoples. There are claims that there is a change of heart and mentality among the Greek Cypriots for a federation. But when we look at them from the North, we see that they continue to reject all the essential elements for a viable federation including the political equality of the Turkish Cypriot people, their right to self-determination and even the very existence of the Turkish Cypriots as a people with the separate identity and culture.

I want to address myself directly to Mr. Vassiliou. The Turkish Cypriots are the party that the Greek Cypriot side needs to come to terms with for a settlement. Nobody else can do this for them. I hope you will continue to realize this fact and adjust your position accordingly so that we can pursue the path of an agreed settlement.

What can you do to give us confidence? Start changing your attitude. Recognize that with your present policy of unrelenting hostility you are doing further damage to our relations. Remedy is already difficult enough; it may prove quite impossible in the near future. Do not drive the wedge between us any deeper.

Our proposal for a joint declaration of intent, as part of an outline for a comprehensive settlement, is not a tactical device. We are not interested in waging an endless war of words with you. We want to find out with certainty if there is any realistic chance of striking an equitable deal with the Greek Cypriot side. We hope we can in the end confirm that there may be such a chance, which would enable your side to pursue the negotiations with our representative after our elections. If not, we would have to make a fresh assessment of the entire situation.

A partnership can only come about if both sides want it and need it, because you look upon yourself as the government of the island and you say that having been elected president by the Greek Cypriot side, you are the legitimate president of the whole island, violating even the provision of the defunct 1960 constitution, according to which executive power rests with the Greek Cypriot president and the Turkish Cypriot vice-president acting conjointly.

No one should condemn us to seek endlessly a partnership that the Greek Cypriot side obviously does not want, but pays lip service to for tactical reasons. It may take some time until the Greek Cypriot appreciates the need, the use and benefit of such a partnership. So we feel that, in the meantime, we should have peaceful relations in any case. If we are going to establish a new association, this becomes an inescapable prerequisite. I know you will call it a precondition, but you will have to admit that this is a positive and indispensable element of partnership. Our declaration of intent is designed to create the prerequisites for meaningful negotiations and to establish the foundations on which the federation will rest.

I suggest, Mr. Secretary-General, that we go over the elements of our proposal and receive the reactions of Mr. Vassiliou to each element, which I hope will not be in the form of a denial or rejection. I would like to underline that we are interested in substance without evasion. I hope this reactions will permit us to proceed to the following items of an outline in a meaningful manner.”

## **THE MEMORANDUM BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS**

1. The President in office of the Council of Ministers has been sent three applications, dated 3 July 1990, by a body calling itself “the Government of the Republic of Cyprus” seeking membership for “Cyprus” (not the Republic of Cyprus) in the three European Communities. In this connection the Turkish Cypriot side respectfully requests the Council of Ministers to take into consideration the following objections and observations.

2. *Cyprus is a two-community island:* The bases of the Turkish Cypriot opposition to the president application is that the Republic of Cyprus as originally conceived and brought into being in 1960 was founded on the existence of two separate and politically equal communities. One Turkish, the other Greek. Whatever may have happened since then and essential elements will be recalled below, the fact remains that there are still two separate communities in Cyprus and a legal background which recognizes the separateness and political equality of these two communities. Even if the Cypriot community has in number of context succeeded in assuming the mantle of “the Republic of Cyprus”,

that is not a consideration that can now entitle it to represent the whole of Cyprus in so fundamental a development as the acquisition of membership in the European Communities.

**3. *Membership in the EC is unworkable in a divided island:*** Unlike any other international relationship into which the Greek Cypriot community has purported to enter – albeit illegally- in the name of “the Republic of Cyprus”, membership in the European Communities would involve a degree of participation by the communities in the life of their members, which is quite unworkable in the circumstances presently prevailing in Cyprus and pending a mutually acceptable comprehensive settlement in the form of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federal republic. The European Communities cannot have, and should not consider having, as an island which is divided into two parts, each separately governed and divided by a firm boundary, when membership demands, among other things, free movement of goods, persons, services and capital, not to mention the application of common policies on such important matters as agriculture, fisheries and transport throughout the territories of the Members of the Communities.

**4. *The application is misconceived:*** The applicant, in submitting an application in respect of “Cyprus” (not, it should be noted, the Republic of Cyprus) suggested a unity of the island, which is not supportable either in law or in fact. They are, regrettably, too often overlooked.

**5. *Early recognition of the two-community nature of Cyprus:*** There are two different peoples in Cyprus. The British Government underlined this historical fact during the period when Cyprus was approaching, independence. The British Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lennox Boyd, said on 19 December 1956.

“It will be the purpose of Her Majesty’s Government to ensure that any exercise of self-determination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, shall in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status. In other words, Her Majesty’s Government recognize that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options. “This statement was confirmed by the Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, on 26 June 1958, who described these assurances as “pledges”.

**6. *Bi-communal essentials of the 1960 settlement:*** Despite the reference to

“Partition” as an option, in answer to Greek Cypriot claims for union of Cyprus with Greece, this was not the solution eventually adopted. Instead, a compromise was reached along the lines of a bi-communal State, in which the respective legal and political positions of the two communities were carefully regulated. Absolutely fundamental to the division of power between the two communities was ideal that one community to the exclusion of the other could not rule Cyprus. Both communities had to participate as partners in all decision-making and in the administration of the island. Equally fundamental was the idea that the greater numbers of the Greek Cypriot community. Adequate checks and balances were provided in the constitution for the preservation of the national identity and partnership status of each community.

**7. *International and constitutional nature of 1960 settlement:*** These fundamentals were incorporated in what has come to be called “the 1960 settlement”. It is characterized by the fact that it is both an international and constitutional settlement. Thus the subsequent conduct of the Greek Cypriot community has to be judged not only in terms of constitutional law, but also of international law.

**8. *Strict division of power between the two communities:*** The 1960 settlement consisted, first, of the Zurich and London Agreement of 1959. These were international treaties, which raised to the level of international obligation the undertakings given by the parties. Thus, the Zurich Agreement, concluded between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers on 11 February 1959, established the Basic Structure of the emergent Republic of Cyprus. It provided, as basic articles for inclusion in the Cyprus Constitution, a clear and balanced division of power between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, including provision for a Greek Cypriot President, elected by Greek Cypriots, and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President elected solely by Turkish Cypriots, and a seventy percent-thirty percent distribution of seats in the Council of Ministers and the legislature, as well as the same allocation of places in the administration. Also, the President and the Turkish Vice-President were granted veto powers, which would have enabled them to block measures prejudicial to their respective communities. Executive power “ensued from the President and Vice-President acting conjointly.”

Another essential feature of the basic articles was the specific exclusion of the total or partial union of Cyprus with any other State.

**9. *International guarantee of the settlement:*** the Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, as well as reinforced the undertakings given in these Agreements by incorporation in the Cyprus Constitution itself. The parties to these treaties were the Republic of Cyprus, on behalf “the Greek Cypriot President and the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President” signed, Greece, Turkey and United Kingdom. These treaties created for the party’s rights and duties under international law. In the Treaty of Guarantee especially the Republic of Cyprus undertook to ensure respect for its constitution, while Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of this undertaking, recognized and guaranteed the *state of affairs* established by the Basic Article of the Constitution. This treaty also expressly provided that “in so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserved the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty.”

**10. *Early Greek Cypriot rejection of Turkish Cypriot participation:*** Within three years of the conclusion of these solemn compacts, the Greek Cypriots had embarked upon a deliberate course of subverting the basic articles. This culminated in the resignation of the neutral President of the Constitutional Court and the eventual denial of each and every right given to Turkish Cypriots under the Constitution. In pursuance of the so called “Akritas Plan” that was aimed at uniting the island with Greece, the Turkish Cypriots were ousted from their guaranteed positions in the organs of government, the political equality and vested rights of the Turkish Cypriots were denied, while the Greek Cypriot members of the House of Representatives enacted, in flagrant violation of the 1960 settlement and the basic articles of the Constitution, legislation providing for the operation of various organs of government without Turkish Cypriot participation. In June 1967, the Greek Cypriot legislature went so far as unanimously to pass a resolution in favor of ENOSIS, union with Greece, so clearly prohibited by Article 185 of the Constitution.

**11. *Separation of the Turkish Cypriot community:*** Since December 1963, the Turkish Cypriot community, faced by discrimination, threats and physical attacks, was, for its self-preservation, compelled gradually to withdraw into self-administering enclaves, cut off from public services and unassisted by public monies. The fact of administrative and territorial division between the communities was acknowledged eleven later by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom in the Declaration of 30 July 1974, which “noted the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community.” It is further attested by the maintenance of a dividing line across the island by UNFICYP, which had arrived in Cyprus with the consent of both sides in March 1964 as a result of a break-up of the partnership state and its administration. In due course, in 1975, the Turkish Cypriot administration which had been administering Turkish Cypriots since the breakdown of the legitimate partnership government, developed into the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, by way of adaptation to the circumstances, and for the purpose of creating the federated Turkish Cypriot wing of a future federal republic of Cyprus, thus re-establishing the defunct partnership state in a federal form.

**12. *Constitutional illegitimacy of Greek Cypriot action acknowledged:*** The lack of constitutional foundation for the Greek Cypriot administration was acknowledged by the foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and United Kingdom in a declaration of 30 July 1974 when they recorded that “among the constitutional questions to be discussed should be that of an immediate return to constitutional legitimacy, the Vice-President assuming the functions provided for under the 1960 Constitution. “Such words could not have been used if the prevailing condition at the time had been one of adherence to the constitution. In fact Makarios had openly declared the 1960 Agreement and the Constitution to be “dead and buried,” and he offered Turkish Cypriot minority rights in what he regarded a Greek Cypriot state. Here was a plain recognition, therefore, that there was not a legitimate government representing the whole population. And the reference to the need for the Vice-President to assume the functions provided for under the 1960 Constitution, coupled with well known fact that the Vice-President had been Turkish and had not voluntarily renounced the exercise of his functions, indicates appreciation that he had been unlawfully excluded from his office – an exclusion which in constitutional terms means – inter alia – that the Turkish Cypriot community was deprived of its right under Article 57 of the Constitution to veto decision relating to foreign affairs (or, conversely, to approve such decision by deliberately acquiescing to them) and the collapse of the partnership state.

**13 .1974 ENOSIS thwarted by guarantor action of Turkey:** Prior to this, however, certain Greek and Greek Cypriot elements had carried one stage further their repudiation of the prohibition of “Enosis”. For the purpose of bringing about immediate “Enosis” in July 1974 a Greek –inspired and military supported coup took place against Archbishop Makarios, who himself had previously maintained that by destroying the constitutional order he had brought Cyprus to the “nearest point to Enosis”.

In the exercise of its rights and duties as a guarantor of the 1960 settlement, and upon the urgent plea of the Turkish Cypriot side for help, Turkey landed forces in Cyprus in order to safeguard the Turkish Cypriot population and prevent a takeover of the island by Greece. They freed the northern part of the island from Greek and Greek Cypriot forces, which Makarios had described to the Security Council On July 19, 1974 as “forces of invasion from Greece”, and made it a haven for the whole Turkish Cypriot population, including those stranded in the enclaves in the South – a process which was completed by the 1975 Agreement on the Voluntary Re-grouping of populations. There now co-exist on the island two separate administrations – The Greek Cypriot Administration in the south, which has assumed the role of “the Republic of Cyprus”, and the Turkish Cypriot administration, which has established itself as the Greek Cypriot side to agree to share power with the Turkish Cypriots on the basis of equality as envisaged in the 1977 and 1979 High Level Agreements.

**14. Greek Cypriots not the lawful government of Cyprus:** In the circumstances set out above, it will be readily understood why the Turkish Cypriots regard as unlawful the assumption by the Greek Cypriots of the role of “the Republic of Cyprus”. That republic was as ordained and in the image of the 1960 settlement. The Greek Cypriots overthrew that settlement in December 1963. Yet they appear to have been accepted internationally as the appropriate representatives of Cyprus. This cannot be right, legally or morally, and no one should be surprised by the view that Turkish Cypriots take of the situation.

**15. International illegality of Greek Cypriot action:** Turkish Cypriots believe that unilateral application by the Greek Cypriots to join the communities is an international act of an entirely different order of intensity and significance than anything that has come before. The Council of Ministers of the European Communities may not lawfully disregard the illegality of the position and conduct of the Greek Cypriot Regime in Cyprus when the latter purports to present itself as the “government of the Republic of Cyprus.” The objection now raised by the TRNC on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot people to the validity of the application rests upon the lack of entitlement of the Greek Cypriot community to make the application in the name of Cyprus or, indeed, “the Republic of Cyprus”. This objection rests only indirectly upon the constitutional illegitimacy of the Greek Cypriot regime, for it is possible to conceive of cases in which merely constitutional illegitimacy would not preclude a regime from seeking admission to an international organization on behalf of a state. However, where, as in this case, the constitutional illegitimacy occasions an international illegitimacy, the position is quite different and cannot be ignored by the European Communities. Moreover, in the case of Cyprus, where the bi-communality of the state and its government was the precondition for legitimacy, this unilateral act by Greek Cypriots is a clear and unacceptable action to impose their political will on the Turkish Cypriots on a matter which will affect generations to come.

**16. Greek Cypriot application violates international and constitutional ban on Enosis”:** The application is also open to objection on the ground, arising from Article 1 of the Treaty Guarantee, and echoed in Article 185 of the constitution, that the Republic of Cyprus has undertaken “not to participate in whole or in part, in any political or economical union with any state whatsoever.” This limitation is broad enough to prohibit the link with Greece that a membership initiated and negotiated by the Greek Cypriots alone would bring about, even within the framework of the European Communities.

**17. Comparison with Germany is false:** Greek Cypriot awareness of the vulnerability of the application is suggested by the following report in the press (see The Wall Street January, 5 July 1990) that Mr. Iacovou, the foreign Minister of the Greek Cypriot regime, said: “**The Island’s political situation shouldn’t have an effect on his country’s membership application. He drew an analogy with Germany, saying that the division of that country into East and West had never been viewed as a barrier to EC membership**”. The “analogy” is quite false and reveals precisely the weakness of the Greek Cypriot application.

When the Federal Republic of Germany became an original member of the European Communities, no claim was made by it that the territorial scope of its membership extended beyond the area under its actual control. It did not claim to represent East Germany for purposes of becoming a member. It is indeed significant that the only territorial matters rose by the FRG related to the position of Land Berlin and the Saar. In the present situation, however, it is evident that the Greek Cypriots do not seek to limit their application in a comparable manner.

**18. Application is a nullity. No action should be taken on it:** The present opposition to the Greek Cypriot applications is of a fundamental nature. It arises **in limine**. The internationally unlawful character of the authority that purports to make the application deprives it of the capacity so to act, while the scope of the application with invalidity. It is a nullity. In law, therefore, there exists no application that the Council of Ministers may refer to the Commission for an opinion and no application that the Commission may properly receive. The suggestion is, accordingly, respectfully made that the proper course is for the Council of Ministers should feel that it is necessary or desirable that the Commission should express an opinion on the validity of the application, then the reference to the Commission should be precisely limited to this. It should not be a reference to the Commission for an opinion on the substance of the application.

**19. TRNC would welcome EC membership, but only after a settlement:** Notwithstanding this, the TRNC does not wish to create the impression that it is opposed to the eventual membership in the European Communities by a state of Cyprus restored to legality and stability by a settlement freely negotiated between parties of equal standing. When such a political settlement has been achieved, the Turkish Cypriot community will be no less desirous than the Greek Cypriot community to secure membership for the whole of Cyprus in a manner that will ensure that the benefit of such membership, as well as its burdens, are enjoyed and born by both communities genuinely, without discrimination between them.

**20. Greek Cypriot admission would mean a second vote for Greece:** In the meantime, it must be recognized that the effect of the admission to the European Committees of the Greek Cypriot side under the assumed title of “the Republic of Cyprus” represented as it is today exclusively by the Greek Cypriot element in the island would, in effect, be to give to Greece a second vote in all the deliberations of the Communities. There is no room for the pretence that, left to it, the Greek Cypriot community, irrevocably committed in spirit as it has always been to union with Greece, would act within the organs of the European Communities as anything other than a proxy of Greece. The only way to ensure that Cyprus acts as fully independent member of the European Committees is to insist that membership should not been given to it until there is reasonable certainty that its foreign and economic policy will not be subservient to the interests of any neighbor. That can only be assured by the establishment within Cyprus of a system of government reflecting the existence of the two communities, each possessing the capacity to prevent the exploitation of the country’s position for the sole or disproportionate benefit of the other.

**21. Application violates most recent U.N. Security Council resolution:** In its most recent resolution on Cyprus, that of 12 March 1990 (649-[1990]), the UN Security Council called on “the parties concerned to refrain from any action that could aggravate the situation.”. In the specialized vocabulary that has developed in this context, the expression “the parties” means not only the two Cypriot communities, but the interested governments, including, with special reference to the present context, Greece. The present move clearly aggravates the situation by destroying the equality of status between the two communities that is the essential foundation for the continuance of negotiations on the wider question.

**22. Membership can only grow out of settlement. Not vice versa:** It must be realized that the entry into the European Communities of a uniquely Greek Cypriot state cannot contribute to the resolution in the European Communities. Participation in the European Communities can only grow out of the creation of a new Republic of Cyprus that fully reflects the proper status and role of both communities.

